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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
 
States can generally assert sovereign immunity to shield 
themselves from lawsuits, but bankruptcy proceedings are one 
of the exceptions.  The Supreme Court held in Central Virginia 
Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 378 (2006), that, by 
ratifying the Bankruptcy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, states 
waived their sovereign immunity defense in proceedings that 
further a bankruptcy court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over 
property of the debtor and its estate (called “in rem 
jurisdiction”).  Here, we apply Katz to a bankruptcy adversary 
proceeding brought by a liquidating trustee for the debtors’ 
assets seeking compensation from the State of California and 
its Lands Commission for the alleged taking of a refinery that 
belonged to the debtors.  Because that proceeding asks the 
Bankruptcy Court to enforce rights in the property of the 
debtors and their estates1 and will facilitate the fair distribution 
of their assets to creditors, it furthers the Court’s in rem 
functions.  Katz thus forecloses the assertion of sovereign 
immunity by both California and its Lands Commission, and 
we affirm the District Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision.    
 
1 “Under the Bankruptcy Code . . . a petition ‘creates an estate’ 
that, with some exceptions, comprises ‘all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of 
the case.’”  City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 589 




I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Venoco, LLC and its affiliated debtors (collectively, 
“Venoco” or the “Debtors”)2 operated the Platform Holly 
drilling rig in the South Ellwood Oil Field (the “Offshore 
Facility”) off the coast of Santa Barbara, California.  After 
extraction, the oil and gas were transported three miles north 
to the Ellwood Onshore Facility (the “Onshore Facility”) for 
processing and refining.  Venoco did not own the Offshore 
Facility and instead leased it from the State of California (the 
“State”) acting through its Lands Commission (together with 
the State, the “California Parties”).  Unlike the Offshore 
Facility, Venoco owns the Onshore Facility and holds the air 
permits to use it. 
 
Following a pipeline rupture in 2015, Venoco could no 
longer get its oil and gas to the market.  It was unable to 
reactivate the pipeline after it emerged from an initial 
bankruptcy filing in 2016, and it filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy again on April 17, 2017 (the latter colloquially 
known as a “Chapter 22”).  That same day, Venoco quitclaimed 
(i.e., abandoned) its leases, thereby relinquishing all rights and 
interests in the Offshore Facility, including the wells and the 
Platform Holly drilling rig.  Concerned about public safety and 
environmental risks, the Commission took over 
decommissioning the rig and plugging the abandoned wells.  It 
initially agreed to pay Venoco approximately $1.1 million per 
month to continue operating the Offshore and Onshore 
Facilities.  In September 2017, a third-party contractor took 
over operations from Venoco.  In place of the previous 
 
2 The parties do not distinguish the various debtor entities. 
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agreement, the Commission and Venoco entered into a Gap 
Agreement, under which the Commission agreed to pay 
$100,000 per month, as well as additional compensation, for 
access to and use of the Onshore Facility.  Meanwhile, the 
Commission also asserted its rights as Venoco’s creditor.  In 
October 2017, it filed an estimated $130 million contingent 
claim against Venoco for reimbursement of plugging and 
decommissioning costs, including $29 to $35 million for the 
cost to operate the Onshore Facility and the rig at the Offshore 
Facility.3 
 
The Gap Agreement, as its name suggests, was not a 
permanent solution.  For several months before the Bankruptcy 
Court confirmed the Debtors’ plan of liquidation (the “Plan”) 
in May 2018, Venoco and the Commission negotiated over a 
potential sale of the Onshore Facility to the Commission.  
When those negotiations failed, the Commission stopped 
paying what it owed under the Gap Agreement.  Invoking its 
police powers to take necessary actions to protect the 
environment and public safety, the Commission argued it could 
continue using the Onshore Facility without payment.   
 
Once the Plan became effective on October 1, 2018, the 
estates’ assets, including the Onshore Facility, were transferred 
to a liquidation trust (the “Trust”).  Eugene Davis, the court-
 
3 In October 2018, the Commission also filed in the Bankruptcy 
Court an “Assertion of Administrative Expense Claim and 
Reservation of Setoff Rights,” which sought to preserve the 
Commission’s right to “set off its allowable administrative 
claim against any claims that have been or may be asserted 
[against it] by the [Trustee].”  JA 594–610.  That document 
was withdrawn in September 2019. 
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appointed liquidation trustee (the “Trustee”), became 
responsible for collecting, holding, liquidating and distributing 
the Trust’s assets for the benefit of Venoco’s creditors. 
 
After the Gap Agreement was terminated on October 
15, 2018, the Trustee filed in the Bankruptcy Court an 
adversary proceeding against the California Parties (the 
“Adversary Proceeding”).  It is primarily a claim for inverse 
condemnation, “a cause of action against a governmental 
defendant to recover the value of property which has been 
taken in fact by the governmental defendant.”  Knick v. Twp. 
of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2019) (citation omitted).  It 
“stands in contrast to direct condemnation, in which the 
government initiates proceedings to acquire title under its 
eminent domain authority.”  Id.  The Trustee argues that, under 
the U.S. and California Constitutions as well as § 105 of the 
Bankruptcy Code,4 the Trust is entitled to just compensation 
for the taking of its property by the California Parties.  While 
the Trustee’s claims are primarily against the Commission, he 
also sued the State “out of an abundance of caution.”  Trustee’s 
Br. at 40.     
 
The California Parties filed motions to dismiss, 
claiming, among other things, they as sovereigns are immune 
from suits.  The Bankruptcy Court denied the motions.  The 
District Court granted leave for the California Parties to appeal 
only the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling on their sovereign 
immunity defense and did not allow interlocutory appeal of 
 
4 11 U.S.C. § 105 is an “omnibus provision phrased in such 
general terms as to be the basis for a broad exercise of power 
in the administration of a bankruptcy case.”  2 Collier on 
Bankruptcy ¶ 105.01 (16th ed. 2021).    
8 
 
other issues.  It affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s rejection of 
the California Parties’ assertion of Eleventh Amendment 
sovereign immunity and held that they forfeited their argument 
on state law immunity from liability (often called “substantive 
immunity”) when they failed to raise the argument before the 
Bankruptcy Court.  The California Parties appeal to us, arguing 
they can assert both Eleventh Amendment and substantive 
immunity defenses.   
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF  
  REVIEW 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(3) over the appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s 
decision.  For the appeal to our Court, the denial of a claim of 
sovereign immunity is “immediately appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine [which permits appeals of some non-
final orders], imbuing us with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.”  See Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 82 
(3d Cir. 2016); see also P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. 
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 141 (1993).  We exercise 
plenary review of the Bankruptcy and District Courts’ legal 
determinations, see In re Goody’s Family Clothing Inc., 610 
F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2010), which includes their denial of 
governmental immunity, see Maliandi, 845 F.3d at 82.   
 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 This case reduces to one question:  Under Katz, can the 
California Parties assert a defense of sovereign immunity in the 
Adversary Proceeding?  Given disagreement on the scope of 
proceedings covered by Katz, we first summarize how the case 




A. Case Law Before Katz   
 In our constitutional structure, states “maintain certain 
attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity.”  In 
re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d 96, 103 (3d Cir. 2019), 
cert. granted, PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S. Ct. 
1289 (Mem.) (2021) (quoting P.R. Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 146).  
This includes, but is not limited to, their immunity from suit in 
federal court recognized by the Eleventh Amendment, which 
reads in part that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State.”  U.S. Const. amend. XI.5  This 
shelter from suit is a “fundamental aspect of the sovereignty 
which the [s]tates enjoyed before the ratification of the 
Constitution, and which they retain today.”  PennEast, 938 
F.3d at 103 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 
(1999)).   
 
However, the sovereign immunity states enjoy is not 
absolute.  They can expressly consent to suit in federal court 
by voluntarily invoking the jurisdiction of federal courts.  See 
Lombardo v. Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 
190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008).  Congress can abrogate states’ 
immunity from suit by unequivocally expressing its intent to 
do so per valid constitutional authority.  See Seminole Tribe of 
 
5 In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890), the Supreme 
Court decided that the Eleventh Amendment also covers suits 
by in-state plaintiffs.  Thus the Eleventh Amendment “bar[s] 
all private suits against non-consenting [s]tates in federal 
court.”  Lombardo v. Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
540 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).  Also, by ratifying the 
U.S. Constitution, states consented to certain waivers of their 
sovereign immunity in the “plan of the convention,” including 
suits by the federal government against them in federal court.  
PennEast, 938 F.3d at 103–04 (quoting Blatchford v. Native 
Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).  
 
 Before Katz, courts faced with the assertion of 
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings focused on the 
scope of congressional (that is, statutory) abrogation.  See 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 n.16 (“[I]t has not been widely 
thought that the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright 
statutes abrogated the [s]tates’ sovereign immunity.”); 
Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 104 
(1989) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code “did not abrogate 
the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the [s]tates”); see also 
United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 39 (1992) 
(holding that the Bankruptcy Code did not clearly abrogate the 
federal government’s immunity from suits for monetary relief).  
In these cases, the question was mainly one of statutory 
interpretation—whether Congress unequivocally expressed its 
intent to end immunity.  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55; 
Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 104 (“[W]e need not address whether 
[Congress] had the authority to [abrogate sovereign immunity] 
under its [constitutional] bankruptcy power.”).    
 
In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code in an 
attempt to overrule the decisions in Hoffman and Nordic 
Village.  See In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 133 F.3d 237, 242 n.8 
(3d Cir. 1998).  Some circuits, including our own, concluded 
that although Congress now “unequivocally expressed its 
intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity 
under the Bankruptcy Code,” the Constitution’s “Bankruptcy 
11 
 
Clause [which authorizes Congress to enact “uniform Laws on 
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”] is 
not a valid source of abrogation power.”  Id. at 243.  These 
holdings, while never explicitly overturned, were soon 
displaced by subsequent Supreme Court case law.   
 
In 2004, the Court set out to resolve a circuit split on the 
validity of the Bankruptcy Code’s purported abrogation of 
sovereign immunity but ended up avoiding the issue altogether.  
In Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 
448 (2004), it rejected an assertion of sovereign immunity 
involving the discharge of student debt guaranteed by an arm 
of the State of Tennessee, concluding that when the 
“bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over the res is unquestioned, . 
. . the exercise of its in rem jurisdiction to discharge a debt does 
not infringe state sovereignty.” Id. (internal citation omitted).6   
The Court did not address the Sixth Circuit’s holding that the 
Bankruptcy Code validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.  
See id. at 445 (“Because we hold that a bankruptcy court’s 
discharge of a student loan debt does not implicate a [s]tate’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, we do not reach the broader 
question addressed by the Court of Appeals.”).  To make the 
limited reach of its opinion clear, the Court explained that its 
decision “is not to say[] a bankruptcy court’s in rem 
jurisdiction overrides sovereign immunity . . . . [n]or . . . that 
every exercise of a bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction will 
 
6 In the bankruptcy context, the debtor’s estate is often referred 
to as the “res” to be administered by the bankruptcy court.  See, 
e.g., In re Phila. Ent. & Dev. Partners, L.P., 549 B.R. 103, 145 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2016); In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 
299 B.R. 251, 273 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The debtor’s 
estate is a res.”).  
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not offend the sovereignty of the State.”  Id. at 451 n.5 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  
 
B. Katz    
 
 The Supreme Court expanded Hood’s narrow holding 
two years later in Katz, which clarified federal power over 
states in bankruptcy cases.  There the liquidating supervisor of 
a bookstore that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy sought to 
recover preferential transfers7 made to Virginia educational 
institutions that were arms of the Commonwealth otherwise 
entitled to sovereign immunity.  Katz, 546 U.S. at 360.  The 
Court sided with the supervisor and rejected the assertion of 
sovereign immunity.  We start with three non-controversial 
observations about Katz.  
 
 First, under the Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause, 
states are deemed to have waived their sovereign immunity in 
certain bankruptcy proceedings.  Id. at 378 (“In ratifying the 
Bankruptcy Clause, the [s]tates acquiesced in a subordination 
of whatever sovereign immunity they might otherwise have 
asserted in proceedings necessary to effectuate the in rem 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.”).  Thus we look to the 
scope of constitutional waiver recognized by Katz instead of 
congressional abrogation through the Bankruptcy Code 
(though, as a theoretical matter, Congress could still through 
 
7 Preferential transfers are defined in 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).  They 
are basically payments made by the debtor to a creditor within 
a short time before the bankruptcy filing that improve (hence 
“prefer”) the creditor’s recovery from what it would otherwise 




legislation “exempt [states] from operation of [certain 
bankruptcy] laws,” id. at 379).  
 
 Second, Katz did not foreclose the sovereign immunity 
defense in all bankruptcy proceedings.  See id. at 378 n.15 
(“We do not mean to suggest that every law labeled a 
‘bankruptcy’ law could, consistent with the Bankruptcy 
Clause, properly impinge upon state sovereign immunity.”).8  
Still, at least one later opinion suggests a broader reading of 
 
8 At least one court has relied on this language to suggest that 
Katz only applies to claims “created by the Bankruptcy Code.”  
Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 
743 F. Supp. 2d 429, 439 (D.N.J. 2010).  We disagree because 
Katz repeatedly referenced bankruptcy “proceedings.”  See 
Katz, 546 U.S. at 362; see also Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 
1002 (2020) (“[W]e held that Article I’s Bankruptcy Clause 
enables Congress to subject nonconsenting [s]tates to 
bankruptcy proceedings.” (emphasis added)); see also Ralph 
Brubaker, Explaining Katz’s New Bankruptcy Exception to 
State Sovereign Immunity:  The Bankruptcy Power as a 
Federal Forum Power, 15 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 95, 129 
(2007) (suggesting Katz gave Congress the power to “bind 
states to[] uniform federal judicial [bankruptcy] process” 
(emphasis omitted)).  In any event, focusing on claims 
“created” by the Bankruptcy Code is an unworkable approach, 
considering the Code often incorporates applicable state laws.  
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (permitting the trustee to 
recover transfers that are voidable under state laws); In re 
DBSI, Inc., 463 B.R. 709, 718 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) 
(explaining that, when applying Katz, “[t]he fact that various 




Katz.  In Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002 (2020), the 
Supreme Court held that the Constitution’s Intellectual 
Property Clause9 did not authorize Congress to abrogate states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from copyright infringement 
suits.  To distinguish that case from Katz, the Court 
emphasized that the Bankruptcy Clause was unique among 
Article I’s grant of authority, explaining that “[i]n bankruptcy, 
we decided[] sovereign immunity has no place,” as “the 
Bankruptcy Clause embraced the idea that federal courts could 
impose on state sovereignty.”  Id.  However, we do not think 
that dictum in Allen means sovereign immunity can never be 
asserted before a bankruptcy court, for Katz was clear that it 
was deemed waived in some but not all bankruptcy 
proceedings.  
 
 Finally, while Katz discussed the bankruptcy court’s in 
rem jurisdiction as the historical underpinning for waiving 
state sovereign immunity, it does not require a proceeding to 
be technically in rem.  546 U.S. at 370.  Indeed, although the 
preference action in Katz was not squarely in rem, sovereign 
immunity still could not be asserted where any court order 
issued in the action would be “ancillary to and in furtherance 
of the court’s in rem jurisdiction, [even if it] might itself 
involve in personam process.”  Id. at 372.  The focus is on 
function and not form, the benefit being that courts do not need 
to struggle with the “blurred distinctions and perplexing case 
law [that confuse] in rem, ancillary to in rem, and even in 
 
9 Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
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personam proceedings in many respects.”  In re DBSI, Inc., 
463 B.R. 709, 714 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012).   
 
We therefore summarize Katz’s holding as follows:  
States cannot assert a defense of sovereign immunity in 
proceedings that further10 a bankruptcy court’s in rem 
jurisdiction no matter the technical classification of that 
proceeding.   
 
C. Analytical Framework for Applying 
Katz   
 
 Katz did not define the range of proceedings that further 
a bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction, but it did tell us 
bankruptcy’s three critical functions: “[1] the exercise of 
exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s property, [2] the 
equitable distribution of that property among the debtor’s 
creditors, and [3] the ultimate discharge that gives the debtor a 
‘fresh start’ by releasing him, her, or it from further liability for 
old debts.”  In re Diaz, 647 F.3d 1073, 1084 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Katz, 546 U.S. at 363–64).  We agree with the 
Eleventh Circuit and several bankruptcy courts that “[t]hese 
guidelines provide a useful starting point.” Id.; see, e.g., In re 
Univ. of Wis. Oshkosh Found., Inc., 586 B.R. 458, 465 (Bankr. 
E.D. Wis. 2018); In re Odom, 571 B.R. 687, 695 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 2017).  Indeed, at oral argument counsel for the Trustee and 
 
10 At various places the Katz opinion described proceedings 
where sovereign immunity is deemed waived as “merely 
ancillary to,” “in furtherance of,” or “necessary to effectuate” 
the bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction.  546 U.S. at 371–
72, 378.  We think these are similar concepts and use “further” 
as a shorthand to summarize Katz’s holding.    
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the Commission agreed that the proper framework analyzes 
whether a proceeding furthers any of these three functions.  
Oral Arg. Tr. 7:19–23, 24:4–9; accord Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1084.   
 
 Under this framework, courts must focus on function 
and not form when testing a proceeding’s connection to the 
bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction.  The first function asks 
whether the proceeding decides and affects interests in the res, 
the property of the debtor and its estate.  Unsurprisingly, courts 
in our Circuit have already been asking this question when 
applying Katz.  See, e.g., In re La Paloma Generating Co., 588 
B.R. 695, 730 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018) (Sontchi, J.) (“[A] 
bankruptcy court's in rem jurisdiction would still need to 
focus[] on adjudications of interests in the underlying res.”); In 
re Phila. Ent. & Dev. Partners, L.P., 549 B.R. 103, 123 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 569 B.R. 394 (E.D. Pa. 2017), rev’d on 
other grounds, 879 F.3d 492 (3d Cir. 2018) (asking whether 
the claims “[i]mplicate an [i]dentifiable [r]es”).  Relying on the 
first function, courts have found that states are deemed to 
waive sovereign immunity in most (i) turnover actions,11 see 
Philadelphia Entertainment, 549 B.R. at 123 (holding 
“sovereign immunity [is] generally inapplicable to turnover 
actions”); In re Kids World of America, Inc., 349 B.R. 152, 
165–66 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006) (same), (ii) fraudulent transfer 
actions,12 see DBSI, 463 B.R. at 713–15 (explaining the clear 
 
11 Under 11 U.S.C. §§ 542 and 543, anyone in possession of 
the debtor’s property may be required to return it—that is, turn 
it over—to the debtor or its trustee.   
12 Fraudulent transfers are defined in 11 U.S.C. § 548 and 
involve transfers made (1) with the intent to defraud creditors 
or (2) while the debtor was insolvent and for which the debtor 
did not receive “reasonably equivalent value.”  See 11 U.S.C. 
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parallels between preferences and fraudulent transfers), and 
(iii) contract disputes, see In re DPH Holdings Corp., 448 F. 
App’x 134, 138 (2d Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (“The contracts, 
which include potential liabilities and responsibilities . . . , are 
part of [the debtor’s] estate.”).13 
 
 The second function captures proceedings where the 
connection to a specific piece of property may be lacking, but 
there is broader effect on the equitable distribution of the 
debtor’s property.  A violation of the automatic stay, where one 
creditor seeks to enforce remedies against the debtor’s property 
despite the injunctive bar of the bankruptcy filing, is one such 
example due to the disruptive effects on orderly administration 
of the estate.  See Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1086 (“[W]e have no 
difficulty concluding that contempt motions alleging that a 
creditor has violated the automatic stay generally qualify as 
‘proceedings necessary to effectuate the in rem jurisdiction of 
the bankruptcy courts.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Katz, 
546 U.S. at 378)).  Of course, there is also significant overlap 
between the first two functions.  Id. at 1085–86 (explaining that 
the automatic stay implicates both functions).    
 
 
§ 548(a)(1)(B)(i).  11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) also incorporates state 
fraudulent transfer laws.  The principal goal is to prevent the 
debtor from “stiffing” creditors by giving away its property 
before filing for bankruptcy.   
13 To be clear, a sovereign immunity defense is not 
categorically foreclosed in those proceedings.  See, e.g., Phila. 
Ent., 549 B.R. at 124 (explaining that a fraudulent transfer 
action relating to revocation of a slot machine license does not 
further a bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction because the 
license is not the debtor’s property).   
18 
 
The third function simply acknowledges the holding of 
Hood that “[s]tates, whether or not they choose to participate 
in the [bankruptcy] proceeding, are bound by a bankruptcy 
court’s discharge order no less than other creditors.”  See Hood, 
541 U.S. at 448; see also People v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 
329, 333 (1933) (holding that states must comply with 
deadlines to file claims like other creditors because, 
“otherwise, orderly and expeditious proceedings would be 
impossible and a fundamental purpose of [bankruptcy] would 
be frustrated”).   
 
 Courts thus analyze correctly if they ask whether a 
proceeding directly relates to one or more of these three 
functions.  See Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1084 (“At a minimum, then, 
a proceeding must directly relate to one or more of these 
functions.”).  We do not offer a one-size-fits-all test because 
claims and proceedings in bankruptcy are varied and fact-
specific.  
   
IV. APPLICATION 
 With the framework for analysis set, we apply it here 
and conclude the California Parties cannot assert sovereign 
immunity in the Adversary Proceeding.  
 
A. The Adversary Proceeding Furthers 
Two of Bankruptcy’s Critical Functions. 
 
At the outset, the Adversary Proceeding furthers the 
Bankruptcy Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over property of 
the Debtors and their estates, as it seeks a ruling on rights in 
the Onshore Facility.  The California Parties repeatedly 
emphasize that the inverse condemnation claim is primarily 
19 
 
one for money damages.  But that alone is irrelevant, for even 
if the action “may resemble money damage lawsuits in form, it 
is their function that is critical.”  Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1085 
(internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphases in 
original).  And while the Adversary Proceeding may not be 
clearly in rem in form, its function is to decide rights in 
Venoco’s property.  See United States v. Sid-Mars Rest. & 
Lounge, Inc., 644 F.3d 270, 286 (5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., 
dissenting) (“Although I have not found cases explicitly 
declaring that inverse condemnation suits are in rem 
proceedings, . . . they are substantially equivalent to 
condemnation actions and essential to the self-executing 
constitutional protection of private property owners from 
governmental takings without just compensation.”).  At its 
core, the Adversary Proceeding is about whether the California 
Parties can use Venoco’s property for free.  See JA 129, 
Complaint ¶ 37 (“Plaintiff is entitled to just compensation, 
including the fair market and fair rental value of the [Onshore 
Facility].”); R & J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Auth., 670 
F.3d 420, 433 n.10 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that seeking 
“compensation for . . . inability to fully utilize, develop, and 
sell their property . . . . are rights inhering in the property 
itself” (emphasis added)).   
 
The Adversary Proceeding also furthers the second 
critical function—facilitating equitable distribution of the 
estate’s assets.  The Onshore Facility is a significant asset for 
Venoco and its creditors.  Indeed, the Plan’s liquidation 
analysis acknowledged the Commission was “receiving 
significant value from the use of the Debtors’ assets” and that 
the “value of the use of those assets [was] being negotiated 
between the parties.”  JA 589.  Further, the Commission is a 
major creditor and filed a proof of claim against Venoco, so the 
20 
 
California Parties have a stake in how the Trust’s assets are 
liquidated and distributed.  And consider the consequences:  If 
the California Parties could assert sovereign immunity in the 
Adversary Proceeding, they would have a win-win—able to 
recover from the Trust on account of their claims against 
Venoco while preventing any judicial scrutiny over whether 
they can use the Onshore Facility without payment.  And they 
would improve their status vis-à-vis other creditors solely 
owing to their status as a state that can invoke sovereign 
immunity, just the kind of result Katz wanted to avoid.  See 
DBSI, 463 B.R. at 713 (“[The aim of equitable distribution of 
the res], and the desire for uniform application of the 
bankruptcy laws, would be jeopardized if the states were able 
to draw resources from the res or retain estate property when 
other creditors were unable to do so.” (citing Katz, 546 U.S. at 
362–64)).   
 
The California Parties urge that sovereign immunity is 
fundamental to our constitutional design and the exercise of 
eminent domain power is especially central to their 
sovereignty.  Though true as a general matter, bankruptcy is a 
different ball game, and the effect on state sovereignty is not 
the focus of our analysis.  The focus is instead on ensuring that 
sovereign immunity will not interfere with the bankruptcy 
court’s jurisdiction over the estate’s property as well as its 
orderly administration.  The driving principle of the Katz 
decision is that the Bankruptcy Clause has a “unique history” 
and is “sui generis . . . among Article I’s grants of authority,” 
the result being “that federal courts could impose on state 
sovereignty” in bankruptcy proceedings.  Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 




 We are also unpersuaded that we must consider that the 
Adversary Proceeding is a type of action both “anomalous and 
unheard of when the Constitution was adopted.”  Fed. 
Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 755 
(2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted).  This simply 
asks for a duplicative and unnecessary historical analysis.  Katz 
explained that the “Framers would have understood that laws 
‘on the subject of Bankruptcies’ included laws providing, in 
certain limited respects, for more than simple adjudications of 
rights in the res . . . . More generally, courts adjudicating 
disputes concerning bankrupts’ estates historically have had 
the power to issue ancillary orders enforcing their in rem 
adjudications.”  546 U.S. at 370.  Thus we do not need to 
analyze whether the exact proceeding existed at the Founding, 
for Katz already concluded that drawing the line at whether a 
proceeding furthers the bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction 
is consistent with the historical understanding of the scope of 
sovereign immunity waiver.  Id.; cf. Hood, 541 U.S. at 452–53.  
 
B. The Deemed Waiver of Sovereign 
Immunity in Katz Can Apply to Post-
Confirmation or Post-Effective Date 
Claims.  
 
  The California Parties also argue that the Adversary 
Proceeding relates only to claims after the Plan was confirmed 
and became effective,14 when the Debtors’ estate ceased to 
 
14 The parties often use the terms “confirmation date” and 
“effective date” interchangeably, but there is a meaningful 
difference.  Typically “the debtor’s estate ceases to exist once 
confirmation [of a plan] has occurred.”  In re Resorts Int’l, Inc., 
372 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also 
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exist, so there is no res for the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction 
to attach.  The Trustee disputes this premise, explaining that, 
due to the nature of the Gap Agreement, the Adversary 
Proceeding also seeks to recover amounts owed for the 
improper taking of the Onshore Facility before the effective 
date.  We do not need to decide whether the Adversary 
Proceeding only pertains to post-effective date claims, as we 
reject the California Parties’ argument even if it were true. 
 
The California Parties essentially ask us to read Katz 
narrowly to carve out all claims that occurred after Venoco’s 
estate was vested in the Trust.  We decline to do so.  In In re 
Resorts International, Inc., 372 F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 2004), 
we held that a bankruptcy court could have jurisdiction over a 
proceeding even when the “estate” no longer technically exists, 
so long as the proceeding has a “close nexus to the bankruptcy 
plan or proceeding.”  To refresh, the issue of bankruptcy 
statutory jurisdiction is not before us because the District Court 
 
11 U.S.C. § 1141(b) (“Except as otherwise provided in the plan 
or the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan 
vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor.”).  However, 
that is not the case here where the order confirming the Plan 
provided that Venoco’s assets were vested in the Trust as of 
the Plan’s effective date, not the confirmation date.  See JA 
459.  While the effective date typically occurs shortly after 
confirmation, there was a nearly five-month delay here 
between confirmation in May 2018 and the Plan going 
effective in October 2018.  Thus the relevant date for the 
California Parties’ argument is the effective date, not the 
confirmation date, though this distinction does not affect the 




did not grant leave to the California Parties to appeal it.  Still, 
the reasoning of Resorts International is of aid.  There, we 
followed our precedent in Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 
994 (3d Cir. 1984), which held bankruptcy courts have 
statutory jurisdiction over a proceeding “related to” bankruptcy 
if the outcome could affect “the estate being administered in 
bankruptcy.”  In that context, we refused to apply the “‘effect 
on the bankruptcy estate’ test so literally as to entirely bar post-
confirmation bankruptcy jurisdiction.”  Resorts Int’l, 372 F.3d 
at 165.     
 
Here, the Bankruptcy Court’s critical in rem functions 
did not end when the Plan became effective, as the Trust exists 
primarily to facilitate the “equitable distribution of [the 
debtor’s property] among the debtor’s creditors.”  Katz, 546 
U.S. at 364.  Indeed, the Bankruptcy Court retained substantial 
control over the Trust assets, which were in essence a 
continuation of the estate.15 As the Plan was one of liquidation, 
 
15 The Confirmation Order states that the Trustee “has been 
fully disclosed in the” Trust Agreement in compliance with 
Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(5), which requires debtors to 
“disclose[] the identity and affiliations of any individual 
proposed to serve, after confirmation of the plan, as . . . a 
successor to the debtor under the plan.”  JA 448; see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(5).  The Trust Agreement further appointed Davis 
“as a representative of the Contributing Debtors’ Estates 
pursuant to sections 1123(a)(5), (a)(7), and (b)(3)(B),” JA 302, 
and authorized him to “[a]llow, settle, object to or reconcile 
any Claims against the Contributing Debtors’ Estates.”  JA 
305.  The Confirmation Order provides that the Court retained 
jurisdiction over, inter alia, actions “[t]o recover all assets of 
the Debtors and property of the Debtors’ Estates, which shall 
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there was no reorganized debtor that continued to do business, 
the Debtors did not receive a discharge, see 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1141(d)(3), and the Bankruptcy Court continued to oversee 
the Trust’s administration and distribution of the estate’s assets 
under the Plan, see 11 U.S.C. § 1142(b).  See also In re Boston 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 410 F.3d 100, 107 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[A] 
liquidating debtor exists for the singular purpose of executing 
an order of the bankruptcy court.”).  
  
Our holding is limited, and we do not try to define the 
entire scope of the Bankruptcy Court’s in rem jurisdiction, 
which the Katz Court described as “premised on the debtor and 
his estate.”  546 U.S. at 370 (quoting Hood, 541 U.S. at 447).  
We only hold that, in this case, the Bankruptcy Court’s in rem 
jurisdiction extends to the estate’s property transferred to the 
Trust for the purpose of liquidation and distribution to 
Venoco’s creditors, and over which the Bankruptcy Court 
retained substantial control under the Plan.  And, contrary to 
the California Parties’ parade of horribles, our conclusion does 
not mean sovereign immunity is waived in every bankruptcy 
 
be for the benefit of the Liquidating Trust, wherever located.”  
JA 473.  Moreover, the Trust Agreement provides that the 
Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction over the Trust and Trustee, 
JA 316; requires court approval before selling or abandoning 
trust assets, JA 305; and states that “[a]ll funds in the 
Liquidating Trust shall be deemed in custodia legis [in the 
custody of the law] until” they are paid out, “and no 
Beneficiary . . . can bind, pledge, encumber, execute upon, 
garnish, or attach the Liquidating Trust Assets or the 
Liquidating Trustee in any manner or compel payment from 
the Liquidating Trustee except by order of the Bankruptcy 
Court,”  JA 317. 
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proceeding brought by a post-confirmation trustee.  A court 
must still undertake the proper analysis under Katz, and it must 
also have statutory jurisdiction over the proceeding under 
Resorts International.   
 
C. The California Parties Cannot Assert 
Eleventh Amendment Immunity or 
State-Law Substantive Immunity from 
Liability.  
 
As the Adversary Proceeding is the type of bankruptcy 
proceeding where states are deemed to waive their sovereign 
immunity, does that waiver extend to both defenses raised by 
the California Parties?  To refresh, they assert Eleventh 
Amendment immunity and state-law substantive immunity 
from liability.  In Lombardo, 540 F.3d at 199, we explained the 
difference between these two defenses.  The first bars all 
private suits against non-consenting states in the federal 
courts.  See U.S. Const. amend. XI; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 
at 72–73; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890).  Second, 
seeing that the Eleventh Amendment does not define the entire 
scope of sovereign immunity, states may also have substantive 
immunity from liability defined under their own law.  See 
Lombardo, 540 F.3d at 195.  As the District Court aptly 
summarized, “[t]he question raised by substantive immunity 
from liability is whether the state has agreed to subject itself to 
liability.  The question raised by Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is whether the state has consented to be sued in a 
federal court.”  In re Venoco, LLC, 610 B.R. 239, 247 (D. Del. 
2020).  The parties here do not dispute that Katz reaches a 
state’s assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity, so the 
California Parties’ defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity 
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fails.  As explained below, we also reject their assertion of 
state-law substantive immunity from liability.  
 
At the outset, we agree with the District Court that the 
California Parties forfeited the argument they have immunity 
from liability when they failed to raise it in the Bankruptcy 
Court.  See In re Kaiser Grp. Int’l Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 565 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (noting the “general rule that when a party fails to 
raise an issue in the bankruptcy court, the issue . . . may not be 
considered by the district court on appeal”).  The California 
Parties argue that the immunity-from-liability defense is 
jurisdictional and therefore can be raised at any time.  We reject 
this view, as “[a] defense rooted in state law cannot define the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, which derives from the 
Constitution and acts of Congress.”  Green v. Graham, 906 
F.3d 955, 964 (11th Cir. 2018).  The California Parties’ 
reliance on Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974), is 
also misplaced, for that case only discussed Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, which “sufficiently partakes of the 
nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the 
trial court.”  Id.  And the Supreme Court never even decided 
“that Eleventh Amendment immunity is a matter of subject-
matter jurisdiction,” see Wis. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 
U.S. 381, 391 (1998), and certainly never suggested that the 
immunity-from-liability defense could be jurisdictional.  
 
Had we reached the merits, the California Parties would 
still not have prevailed, for it is well settled they can be sued in 
California courts for the alleged violation of the Takings 
Clause under the U.S. or California Constitutions; so they are 
not actually immune from liability under California law.  See 
U.S. Const. amend. V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”); Cal. Const. art. 1, 
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§ 19 (“Private property may be taken or damaged for a public 
use and only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury 
unless waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the 
owner.”).  The Supreme Court recognizes that the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is “self-executing” without 
statutory recognition, so “states [must] provide a specific 
remedy for takings in their own courts.”  See Seven Up Pete 
Venture v. Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(citing First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)).  Similarly, the 
California Constitution’s takings provision is also self-
executing without the need for more state legislation, meaning 
the State already indicated its consent to be sued when 
adequate payment to an owner did not follow a taking.  See 
Rose v. State, 123 P.2d 505, 513 (Cal. 1942) (“[I]f no statute 
exists, liability still exists.”).   
 
Indeed, the California Parties as much as conceded they 
are not categorically immune from liability under California 
law and argue only that any suit against the State alleging an 
unconstitutional taking must be litigated in its own 
courts.  Comm’n’s Op. Br. at 53 n.21.  But this is an argument 
about the forum for suit and not liability.  To the extent they 
are invoking a third defense—a state law immunity-from-suit 
defense—we and other circuits have not recognized it.  See 
Lombardo, 540 F.3d at 194; see also Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. 
Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 250–55 (5th Cir. 2005).  Further, 
allowing the California Parties to assert a state law immunity-
from-suit defense separate from Eleventh Amendment 
immunity would make the decision in Katz a dead letter.  If that 
argument prevails, state legislation can easily end-run the 
deemed waiver of state sovereign immunity effected by the 
Bankruptcy Clause and recognized in Katz.  Tellingly, Katz 
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never limited its reach to only Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.  546 U.S. at 378 (“In ratifying the Bankruptcy 
Clause, the [s]tates acquiesced in a subordination of whatever 
sovereign immunity they might overwise have asserted.” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 377 (“States agreed . . . not to assert 
any sovereign immunity defense they might have had.” 
(emphasis added)).16   
 
Thus the California Parties’ assertion of substantive 
immunity from liability under state law also fails.  Because we 
reject the asserted sovereign immunity defenses, we do not 
reach whether the Commission also waived its sovereign 
immunity defenses by filing a proof of claim in the Bankruptcy 
Court and whether that waiver can be attributed to the State.   
 
*    *    *    *    * 
State sovereign immunity is a critical feature of the U.S. 
Constitution, but it is not absolute.  When they ratified the 
Constitution, states waived their sovereign immunity defense 
in bankruptcy proceedings that further a bankruptcy court’s 
exercise of its in rem jurisdiction.  We have such a proceeding 
 
16 We do not go as far as holding that the substantive-
immunity-from-liability defense is deemed waived in every 
proceeding where sovereign immunity is rejected under Katz.  
We hold off because the California Parties do not have 
immunity from liability here, and there may be potential 
daylight between the two defenses when applying Katz to a 
state-law cause of action.  See Brubaker, supra, at 132 
(describing potential complications with applying Katz to 




here, which seeks a ruling on rights in the Debtors’ property 
and will affect the distribution of assets to the Debtors’ 
creditors.  We affirm the District Court’s affirmance of the 
Bankruptcy Court’s ruling and reject the California Parties’ 
assertion of sovereign immunity in the Adversary Proceeding.  
